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Banking in General Equilibrium

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  • Ben S. Bernanke
  • Mark L. Gertler

Abstract

This paper attempts to provide a step towards understanding the role of financial intermediaries ("banks") in aggregate economic activity. We first develop a model of the intermediary sector which is highly simplified, but rich enough to motivate several special features of bauks. Of particular importance in our model is the assumption that banks are more efficient than the public in evaluating and auditing certain information --intensive loan projects. Banks are also assumed to have private information about their investments, which motivates the heavy reliance of banks on debt rather than equity finance and their need for buffer stock capital. We embed this intermediary sector in a general equilibrium framework, which includes consumers and a non-banking investment sector. Mainly because banks have superior access to some investments, factors affecting the size or efficiency of banking will also have an impact on the aggregate economy. Among the factors affecting intermediation, we show, are the adequacy of bank capital, the riskiness of bank investments, and the costs of bank monitoring. We also show that our model is potentially useful for understanding the macroeconomic effects of phenomena such as financial crises, disintermediation, banking regulation, and certain types of monetary policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben S. Bernanke & Mark L. Gertler, 1985. "Banking in General Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 1647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1647
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Barth, Andreas & Seckinger, Christian, 2018. "Capital regulation with heterogeneous banks – Unintended consequences of a too strict leverage ratio," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 455-465.
    2. Lubello, Federico & Petrella, Ivan & Santoro, Emiliano, 2019. "Bank assets, liquidity and credit cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 265-282.
    3. Dungey, Mardi & Flavin, Thomas J. & Lagoa-Varela, Dolores, 2020. "Are banking shocks contagious? Evidence from the eurozone," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    4. Kevin Moran & Cesaire Meh, 2004. "Bank Capital, Agency Costs, and Monetary Policy," 2004 Meeting Papers 318, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2002. "Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 401-417.
    6. de la Fuente, Angel & Marin, JoseMaria, 1996. "Innovation, bank monitoring, and endogenous financial development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 269-301, October.
    7. Federico Lubello & Ivan Petrella & Emiliano Santoro, 2018. "Chained financial frictions and credit cycles," BCL working papers 116, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    8. Calomiris, Charles W & Hubbard, R Glenn, 1990. "Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance, and 'Credit Rationing.'," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(399), pages 90-104, March.
    9. Martin Eichenbaum & Kenneth I. Singleton, 1986. "Do Equilibrium Real Business Cycle Theories Explain Postwar US Business Cycles?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 91-146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Francisco Rosende & Luis Oscar Herrera, 1991. "Teoría y Política Monetaria: Elementos para el Análisis," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 28(83), pages 55-94.
    11. Steven Ongena, 1999. "Lending Relationships, Bank Default and Economic Activity," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 257-280.
    12. Steven Ongena, 1995. "Monetary policy and credit conditions: new evidence," Macroeconomics 9503001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Emmanuel Carré & Laurent Le Maux, 2023. "Bernanke and Kindleberger on financial crises, 1978–2003," Post-Print hal-04201556, HAL.
    14. Mervyn K. Lewis, 1992. "Modern Banking in Theory and Practice," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(2), pages 203-228.
    15. Francisco Rosende & Rodrigo Vergara, 1986. "Opciones de Política para el Sector Financiero," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 23(70), pages 373-398.

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