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Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy

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  • Hilary Sigman

Abstract

This chapter applies recent research on environmental enforcement to a potential U.S. program to control greenhouse gases, especially through emission trading. Climate policies present the novel problem of integrating emissions reductions that are relatively easy to monitor (such as carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels) with those that may be very difficult to monitor (such as some emissions of other greenhouse gases). The paper documents the heterogeneity in monitoring costs across different parts of current carbon markets. It argues that a broad emission trading system that includes more difficult-to-enforce components can provide less incentive to violate the law than a narrower program; thus, the government may not find it more costly to assure compliance with a broader program.

Suggested Citation

  • Hilary Sigman, 2010. "Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy," NBER Working Papers 16121, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16121
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    Cited by:

    1. Hilary Sigman & Howard F. Chang, 2011. "The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets with Imperfect Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 268-272, May.
    2. Alessio D’Amato & Edilio Valentini, 2011. "Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 141-159, October.
    3. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 424-479, June.
    4. Gary D. Libecap, 2013. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," NBER Working Papers 19501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Bento, Antonio M. & Kanbur, Ravi & Leard, Benjamin, 2015. "Designing efficient markets for carbon offsets with distributional constraints," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 51-71.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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