Do Americans Consume Too Little Natural Gas? An Empirical Test of Marginal Cost Pricing
AbstractThis paper measures the extent to which prices exceed marginal costs in the U.S. natural gas distribution market during the period 1991-2007. We find large departures from marginal cost pricing in all 50 states, with residential and commercial customers facing average markups of over 40%. Based on conservative estimates of the price elasticity of demand these distortions impose hundreds of millions of dollars of annual welfare loss. Moreover, current price schedules are an important pre-existing distortion which should be taken into account when evaluating carbon taxes and other policies aimed at addressing external costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15885.
Date of creation: Apr 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Lucas W. Davis & Erich Muehlegger, 2010. "Do Americans consume too little natural gas? An empirical test of marginal cost pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 791-810.
- Davis, Lucas W. & Muehlegger, Erich, 2010. "Do Americans Consume Too Little Natural Gas? An Empirical Test Of Marginal Cost Pricing," Working paper 579, Regulation2point0.
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
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