Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cindy R. Alexander
  • Mark A. Chen
  • Duane J. Seppi
  • Chester S. Spatt
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper studies the information content and consequences of third-party voting advice issued during proxy contests. We document significant abnormal stock returns around proxy vote recommendations and develop an estimation procedure for disentangling stock price effects due to changes in outcome probabilities from those due to changes in outcome-contingent valuations. We find that voting advice is a good predictor of contest outcomes and that vote recommendations appear to certify the extent to which dissidents can add value. Thus, proxy advice seems to play a dual informational role in financial markets.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15143.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15143.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Jul 2009
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: published as “Interim News and the Role of Proxy Voting Advice,” December 2010 (with C . Alexander, M . Chen and D . Seppi), Revi ew of Financial Studies , 23, 4419 - 4454.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15143

    Note: AP CF
    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
    Phone: 617-868-3900
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.nber.org
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Pablo Ruiz-Verdú & Ravi Singh, 2014. "Board Independence, CEO Pay, and Camouflaged Compensation," Business Economics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa wb140704, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    2. Cynthia Clark & Harry Van Buren, 2013. "Compound Conflicts of Interest in the US Proxy System," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, Springer, vol. 116(2), pages 355-371, August.
    3. Daines, Robert M. & Gow, Ian D. & Larcker, David F., 2010. "Rating the ratings: How good are commercial governance ratings?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 439-461, December.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15143. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.