A search-theoretic model of the retail market for illegal drugs is developed. Trade occurs in bilateral, potentially long-lived matches between sellers and buyers. Buyers incur search costs when experimenting with a new seller. Moral hazard is present because buyers learn purity only after a trade is made. The model produces testable implications regarding the distribution of purity offered in equilibrium, and the duration of the relationships between buyers and sellers. These predictions are consistent with available data. The effectiveness of different enforcement strategies is evaluated, including some novel ones which leverage the moral hazard present in the market.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
14980.
Length: Date of creation: May 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14980
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2004.
"Money and Information,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 915-944, October.
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Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, .
"Money and Information,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp099, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
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