Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the Self-interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andreas Lange
  • Andreas Löschel
  • Carsten Vogt
  • Andreas Ziegler

Abstract

We discuss self-interested uses of equity arguments in international climate negotiations. Using unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we show that the perceived support of different equity rules by countries or groups of countries may be explained by their economic costs. Despite being self-interested, equity arguments may be perceived as being used for different reasons, for example, out of fairness considerations or in order to facilitate negotiations. Consistent with experimental and behavioral studies on fairness perceptions, we find that individuals are more likely to state reasons with positive attributes if they evaluate their own region or regions that support the individual’s personally preferred equity rule. Negotiators perceive the use of equity by regions as less influenced by pressure from interest groups.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14930.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14930.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Lange, Andreas & Löschel, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2010. "On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 359-375, April.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14930

Note: EEE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
  2. Michael R. Ransom & Gordon B. Dahl, 1999. "Does Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 703-727, September.
  3. Konow, James, 2001. "Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 137-164, October.
  4. Geweke, John & Keane, Michael P & Runkle, David, 1994. "Alternative Computational Approaches to Inference in the Multinomial Probit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(4), pages 609-32, November.
  5. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  6. Gaechter,S. & Riedl,A., 2002. "Moral property rights in bargaining," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 330, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  7. White, Halbert, 1982. "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 1-25, January.
  8. Konow, James, 1996. "A positive theory of economic fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 13-35, October.
  9. Lange, Andreas, 2004. "The Impact of Equity-preferences on the Stability of Heterogeneous International Agreements," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 04-50, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  10. Borsch-Supan, Axel & Hajivassiliou, Vassilis A., 1993. "Smooth unbiased multivariate probability simulators for maximum likelihood estimation of limited dependent variable models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 347-368, August.
  11. Christoph Böhringer & Thomas Rutherford, 2002. "Carbon Abatement and International Spillovers," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(3), pages 391-417, July.
  12. Löschel, Andreas & Lange, Andreas & Hoffmann, Tim & Böhringer, Christoph & Moslener, Ulf, 2004. "Assessing Emission Allocation in Europe: An Interactive Simulation Approach," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 04-40, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  13. Simon G�chter & Arno Riedl, 2003. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 03-055/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  14. Carmen Herrero, 1997. "Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 113-119.
  15. Muhleisen, Martin & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 1994. "A panel analysis of job changes and unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 793-801, April.
  16. Criqui, Patrick & Mima, Silvana & Viguier, Laurent, 1999. "Marginal abatement costs of CO2 emission reductions, geographical flexibility and concrete ceilings: an assessment using the POLES model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 585-601, October.
  17. Lasse Ringius & Asbjørn Torvanger & Arild Underdal, 2002. "Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-22, March.
  18. Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten, 2001. "Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 01-14, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  19. Klepper, Gernot & Peterson, Sonja, 2006. "Marginal abatement cost curves in general equilibrium: The influence of world energy prices," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) 3775, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  20. Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2000. "The Impact of Fairness on Decision Making - An Analysis of Different Video Experiments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse14_2001, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Feb 2002.
  21. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  22. Babcock, Linda & Wang, Xianghong & Lowenstein, George, 1996. "Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-19, February.
  23. Toman, Michael & Shogren, Jason, 2000. "Climate Change Policy," Discussion Papers, Resources For the Future dp-00-22, Resources For the Future.
  24. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
  25. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1992. "Bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 19-33, August.
  26. Thompson, Leigh & Loewenstein, George, 1992. "Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interpersonal conflict," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 176-197, March.
  27. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  28. James Konow, 2000. "Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1072-1091, September.
  29. Böhringer, Christoph & Helm, Carsten, 2008. "On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 260-276, May.
  30. Keane, Michael P, 1994. "A Computationally Practical Simulation Estimator for Panel Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 95-116, January.
  31. Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002376, David K. Levine.
  32. Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2006. "On the Importance of Equity in International Climate Policy: An Empirical Analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 06-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14930. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.