We propose a model where investors hire fund managers to invest either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some managers have superior information on the default probability. Looking at the past performance, investors update beliefs on their managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns which affect investment decisions, generating a positive or negative "reputational premium". For example, when the default probability is high, uninformed managers prefer to invest in riskless assets to reduce the probability of being fired. As the economic and financial conditions change, the reputational premium amplifies the reaction of prices and capital flows.
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14898.
Length: Date of creation: Apr 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14898
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
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