Competitive Lending with Partial Knowledge of Loan Repayment
AbstractWe study a competitive credit market in which lenders with partial knowledge of loan repayment use one of three decision criteria – maximization of expected utility, maximin, or minimax regret – to make lending decisions. Lenders allocate endowments between loans and a safe asset, while borrowers demand loans to undertake investments. Borrowers may incompletely repay their loans when investment productivity turns out to be low ex post. We characterize market equilibrium, the contracted repayment rate being the price variable that equilibrates loan supply and demand. Supposing that a public Authority wants to maximize the net social return to borrowing, we study two interventions in the credit market to achieve this objective. One intervention manipulates the return on the safe asset and the other guarantees a minimum loan return to lenders. In a simple scenario, we find that manipulation of the return on the safe asset can be an effective way to achieve the socially desired outcome if lender beliefs about the return to lending are not too pessimistic relative to the beliefs of the Authority. Contrariwise, guaranteeing a minimum loan return can be effective if lender beliefs are not too optimistic relative to the beliefs of the Authority.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14378.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Competitive Lending with Partial Knowledge of Loan Repayment: Some Positive and Normative Analysis WILLIAM A. BROCK1, CHARLES F. MANSKI2 Article first published online: 21 MAR 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00380.x © 2011 The Ohio State University Issue Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Volume 43, Issue 2-3, pages 441–459, March-April 2011
Note: AP ME PE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, 2009. "Ambiguity and Nonparticipation: The Role of Regulation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(5), pages 1817-1843, May.
- Brock,W.A., 2004.
"Profiling problems with partially identified structure,"
21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- William A. Brock, 2006. "Profiling Problems With Partially Identified Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages F427-F440, November.
- Charles F. Manski, 2005.
"Search Profiling with Partial Knowledge of Deterrence,"
NBER Working Papers
11848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charles F. Manski, 2006. "Search Profiling With Partial Knowledge of Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages F385-F401, November.
- Charles Manski, 2008. "Adaptive partial policy innovation: coping with ambiguity through diversification," CeMMAP working papers CWP10/08, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Alan Greenspan, 2004. "Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 33-40, May.
- Anufriev, Mikhail & Bottazzi, Giulio, 2010. "Market equilibria under procedural rationality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1140-1172, November.
- Tiziana Assenza & William Brock & Cars Hommes, 2013. "Animal Spirits, Heterogeneous Expectations and the Emergence of Booms and Busts," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def7, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
- Assenza, T. & Brock, W.A. & Hommes, C.H., 2012. "Animal Spirits, Heterogeneous Expectations and the Amplification and Duration of Crises," CeNDEF Working Papers 12-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
- Anufriev, M. & Bottazzi, G., 2009. "Market Equilibria under Procedural Rationality (revised version of WP 06-02)," CeNDEF Working Papers 09-11, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.