This paper explores the question of whether hedge funds engage in front-running strategies that exploit the predictable trades of others. One potential opportunity for front-running arises when distressed mutual funds -- those suffering large outflows of assets under management -- are forced to sell stocks they own. We document two pieces of evidence that are consistent with hedge funds taking advantage of this opportunity. First, in the time series, the average returns of long/short equity hedge funds are significantly higher in those months when a larger fraction of the mutual-fund sector is in distress. Second, at the individual stock level, short interest rises in advance of sales by distressed mutual funds.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
13786.
Length: Date of creation: Feb 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13786
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy H0 - Public Economics - - General
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Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2005.
"Predatory Trading,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1825-1863, 08.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2004.
"Predatory Trading,"
NBER Working Papers
10755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Markus K Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pederson, 2003.
"Predatory Trading,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp441, Financial Markets Group.
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Brunnermeier, Markus K & Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2004.
"Predatory Trading,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4639, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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