Custom Made Versus Ready to Wear Treatments; Behavioral Propensities in Physician's Choices
AbstractTo customize treatments to individual patients entails costs of coordination and cognition. Thus, providers sometimes choose treatments based on norms for broad classes of patients. We develop behavioral hypotheses explaining when and why doctors customize to the particular patient, and when instead they employ "ready-to-wear" treatments. Our empirical studies examining length of office visits and physician prescribing behavior find evidence of norm-following behavior. Some such behavior, from our studies and from the literature, proves sensible; but other behavior seems far from optimal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13445.
Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Publication status: published as Frank, Richard G. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2007. "Custom-made versus ready-to-wear treatments: Behavioral propensities in physicians' choices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1101-1127, December.
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- Frank, Richard G. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2007. "Custom-made versus ready-to-wear treatments: Behavioral propensities in physicians' choices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1101-1127, December.
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
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