Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Custom Made Versus Ready to Wear Treatments; Behavioral Propensities in Physician's Choices

Contents:

Author Info

  • Richard G. Frank
  • Richard J. Zeckhauser

Abstract

To customize treatments to individual patients entails costs of coordination and cognition. Thus, providers sometimes choose treatments based on norms for broad classes of patients. We develop behavioral hypotheses explaining when and why doctors customize to the particular patient, and when instead they employ "ready-to-wear" treatments. Our empirical studies examining length of office visits and physician prescribing behavior find evidence of norm-following behavior. Some such behavior, from our studies and from the literature, proves sensible; but other behavior seems far from optimal.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13445.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13445.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Frank, Richard G. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2007. "Custom-made versus ready-to-wear treatments: Behavioral propensities in physicians' choices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1101-1127, December.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13445

Note: HC
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  2. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
  3. Glied, Sherry & Zivin, Joshua Graff, 2002. "How do doctors behave when some (but not all) of their patients are in managed care?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 337-353, March.
  4. Phelps, Charles E., 2000. "Information diffusion and best practice adoption," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 223-264 Elsevier.
  5. Amitabh Chandra & Douglas O. Staiger, 2007. "Productivity Spillovers in Health Care: Evidence from the Treatment of Heart Attacks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 103-140.
  6. Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M, 1992. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1137-60, November.
  7. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Lorens A. Helmchen & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, 2010. "How sensitive is physician performance to alternative compensation schedules? Evidence from a large network of primary care clinics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(11), pages 1300-1317.
  2. Anna A. Levine Taub & Anton Kolotilin & Robert S. Gibbons & Ernst R. Berndt, 2011. "The Diversity of Concentrated Prescribing Behavior: An Application to Antipsychotics," NBER Working Papers 16823, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Stefan T. Trautmann & Ulrich Schmidt, 2011. "Pricing risk and ambiguity: The effect of perspective taking," Kiel Working Papers 1727, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  4. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette & Martin Schmidt & Cornelius Schnitzler, 2013. "Custom-made healthcare – An experimental investigation," CIRANO Working Papers 2013s-15, CIRANO.
  5. Zeckhauser, Richard Jay & Trautmann, Stefan T, 2011. "Shunning Uncertainty: The Neglect of Learning Opportunities," Scholarly Articles 5347068, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
  6. Mariana Carrera & Dana Goldman & Geoffrey Joyce, 2013. "Heterogeneity in Cost-Sharing and Cost-Sensitivity, and the Role of the Prescribing Physician," NBER Working Papers 19186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2013. "Information and Quality when Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards," NBER Working Papers 18804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Andrew Epstein & Scott Johnson, 2012. "Physician response to financial incentives when choosing drugs to treat breast cancer," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 285-302, December.
  9. Jason Shafrin, 2010. "Operating on commission: analyzing how physician financial incentives affect surgery rates," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(5), pages 562-580.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13445. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.