Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model
AbstractThe Lagos-Wright model -- a monetary model in which pairwise meetings alternate in time with a centralized meeting -- has been extensively analyzed, but always using particular trading protocols. Here, trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of implementability: one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings. It is shown that the first-best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion with- out taxation if people are sufficiently patient. And, if people are free to skip the centralized meeting, then lump-sum taxation used to pay interest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13310.
Date of creation: Aug 2007
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Publication status: published as Tai-wei Hu & John Kennan & Neil Wallace, 2009. "Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(1), pages 116-137, 02.
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- Tai-wei Hu & John Kennan & Neil Wallace, 2009. "Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(1), pages 116-137, 02.
- E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-08-14 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2007-08-14 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2007-08-14 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2007-08-14 (Monetary Economics)
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