Basel II: A Contracting Perspective
AbstractFinancial safety nets are incomplete social contracts that assign responsibility to various economic sectors for preventing, detecting, and paying for potentially crippling losses at financial institutions. This paper uses the theories of incomplete contracts and sequential bargaining to interpret the Basel Accords as a framework for endlessly renegotiating minimal duties and standards of safety-net management across the community of nations. Modelling the stakes and stakeholders represented by different regulators helps us to understand that inconsistencies exist in prior understandings about the range of sectoral effects that the 2004 Basel II agreement might produce. The analysis seeks to explain why, in the U.S., attempting to resolve these inconsistencies has spawned an embarrassingly fractious debate and repeatedly pushed back Basel II's scheduled implementation.
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Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Other versions of this item:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
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