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British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development in India

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  • Shilpi Kapur
  • Sukkoo Kim
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    Abstract

    We explore the impact of British colonial institutions on the economic development of India. In some regions, the British colonial government assigned property rights in land and taxes to landlords whereas in others it assigned them directly to cultivators or non-landlords. Although Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that agricultural productivity of non-landlord areas diverged and out-performed relative to landlord areas after 1965 with the advent of the Green Revolution, we find evidence of superior economic performance of non-landlord regions in both the pre- and the post-independence periods. We believe that landlord and non-landlord regions diverged because their differing property rights institutions led to differences in incentives for development.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12613.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12613

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    1. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
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    6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal Of Fortune: Geography And Institutions In The Making Of The Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294, November.
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    Cited by:
    1. Tanika Chakraborty & Sukkoo Kim, 2008. "Caste, Kinship and Sex Ratios in India," NBER Working Papers 13828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Tanika Chakraborty & Sukkoo Kim, 2010. "Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India," Demography, Springer, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 989-1012, November.

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