Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets
AbstractWe argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12107.
Date of creation: Mar 2006
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- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
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- NEP-ALL-2006-04-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-04-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-FIN-2006-04-01 (Finance)
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- Peng, Lin & Röell, Ailsa A, 2009. "Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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