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Asset Prices When Agents are Marked-to-Market

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Author Info
Gary Gorton
Ping He
Lixin Huang

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Abstract

"Risk management" in securities markets refers to the oversight of portfolio managers and professional traders when they trade on behalf of investors in security markets. Monitoring of their trading performance, profit and loss, and risk-taking behavior, is measured by principals using security market prices. We study the optimality of the practice of marking-to-market and provide conditions under which investing principals should optimally monitor their agent traders using market prices to measure traders' performance. Asset prices, however, can be affected by mark-to-market contracts. We show that such contracts introduce an externality when there are many traders. Traders may rationally herd, trading on irrelevant information. Ironically, this causes asset prices to be less informative than they would be without the mark-to-market feature.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12075.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12075

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  1. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1024-50, October.
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  2. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1985. "Delegated portfolio management," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hui Ou-Yang, 2003. "Optimal Contracts in a Continuous-Time Delegated Portfolio Management Problem," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 173-208.
  4. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1997. "Does It All Add Up? Benchmarks and the Compensation of Active Portfolio Managers," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(3), pages 323-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," NBER Reprints 0121, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  6. Michael Brennan, 1993. "Agency and Asset Pricing," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1147, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Franklin Allen, 2001. "Do Financial Institutions Matter?," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-04, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  8. Allen, Franklin & Gorton, Gary, 1993. "Churning Bubbles," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(4), pages 813-36, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1994. " Arbitrage Chains," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(3), pages 819-49, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Dasgupta, Amil & Prat, Andrea & Verardo, Michela, 2007. "Institutional Trade Persistence and Long-Term Equity Returns," CEPR Discussion Papers 6374, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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