Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements
AbstractAlthough nation-based systems of financial regulation constitute a second-best approach to global welfare maximization, treacherous accountability problems must be acknowledged and resolved before regulatory cooperation can deal fairly and efficiently with cross-border issues. To track and control insolvency risk within and across any set of countries, officials must construct a partnership that allows regulators in every participating country to monitor and to influence counterpart regulators in partnering nations. Using efforts to harmonize the Australian and New Zealand regulatory systems as an example, this paper identifies characteristics by which regulatory systems differ and underscores particular features that make regulatory harmonization difficult to achieve.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11865.
Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Publication status: published as Edward J. Kane, 2006. "Confronting divergent interests in cross-country regulatory arrangements," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 69, pages 12p., June.
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Other versions of this item:
- Edward J. Kane, 2006. "Confronting divergent interests in cross-country regulatory arrangements," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 69, pages 12p., June.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
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