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The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Benjamin Chiao
  • Josh Lerner
  • Jean Tirole

Abstract

This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11156.

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Date of creation: Feb 2005
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Publication status: published as Chiang, Benjamin, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis" Rand Journal of Economics 38 (2007): 905 - 930.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11156

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  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Klemperer, Paul, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, 2008. "Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 54(11), pages 1920-1934, November.
  3. Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1988. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt08w115vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. William Lehr, 1996. "Compatibility Standards And Industry Competition: Two Case Studies," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(2), pages 97-112.
  5. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2006. "A Model of Forum Shopping," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1091-1113, September.
  6. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "A Model of Forum Shopping, with Special Reference to Standard Setting Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Certifying New Technologies," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 734-744, 04/05.
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