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Aging and the Welfare State: The Role of Young and Old Voting Pivots

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Author Info
Assaf Razin
Efraim Sadka

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Abstract

An income tax is generally levied on both capital and labor income. The working young bears mostly the burden of the tax on labor income, whereas the retired old, who already acummulated her savings, bears the brunt of the capital income tax. Therefore, there arise two types of conflict in the determination of the income tax: the standard intragenerational conflict between the poor and the rich, and an ntergenerational conflict between the young and the old. The paper studies how aging affects the resolution of these conflicts, and the politico-economic forces that are at play: the changes in the voting pivots and the fiscal leakage from tax payers to transfer recipients.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10967.

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Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10967

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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  1. Tosun, Mehmet Serkan, 2003. "Population aging and economic growth: political economy and open economy effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 291-296, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
  3. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1993. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," NBER Working Papers 4486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Phillip Swagel, 2002. "The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 900-918, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alexander Ludwig & Joachim Winter, 2003. "Aging, pension reform, and capital flows: A multi-country simulation model," MEA discussion paper series 03028, Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  9. repec:fth:coluec:625 is not listed on IDEAS
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