Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits
AbstractThis paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10742.
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Jesse Fried. “Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits.” 1 Berkeley Business Law Journal (2004): 291-326.
Note: CF LE
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