Detecting Medicare Abuse
AbstractThis paper identifies which types of patients and hospitals have abusive Medicare billings that are responsive to law enforcement. For a 20 percent random sample of elderly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized from 1994-98 with one or more of six illnesses that are prone to abuse, we obtain longitudinal claims data linked with Social Security death records, hospital characteristics, and state/year-level anti-fraud enforcement efforts. We show that increased enforcement leads certain types of types of patients and hospitals to have lower billings, without adverse consequences for patients' health outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10677.
Date of creation: Aug 2004
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Publication status: published as Becker, David, Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan. "Detecting Medicare Abuse," Journal of Health Economics, 2005, v24(1,Jan), 189-210.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2004-08-31 (Health Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2004-08-31 (Law & Economics)
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