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Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions: Evidence from Sponsored Pension Plans

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Author Info
Daniel Bergstresser
Mihir A. Desai
Joshua Rauh
Abstract

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. We construct a measure of the sensitivity of reported earnings to the assumed long-term rate of return on pension assets. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Managers also increase assumed rates of return as they prepare to acquire other firms and as they exercise stock options, further confirming the opportunistic nature of these increases. Decisions about assumed rates of return, in turn, influence asset allocation within pension plans. Instrumental variables results suggest that a 25 basis point increase in the assumed rate of return is associated with a 5% increase in equity allocation. Taken together, these results suggest that earnings manipulation arising from managerial motivations influences significant managerial investment decisions.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10543.

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Date of creation: Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10543

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M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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  4. Martin Feldstein & Stephanie Seligman, 1981. "Pension Funding, Share Prices, and National Saving," NBER Working Papers 0509, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Patrick Bolton & Jose A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2003. "Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000124, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Francesco Franzoni & José M. Marín, 2006. "Pension Plan Funding and Stock Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 921-956, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Ivo Welch, 2001. "The Equity Premium Consensus Forecast Revisited," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1325, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 107-155, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. "Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 148-53, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Konan Chan & Louis K. C. Chan & Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Josef Lakonishok, 2001. "Earnings Quality and Stock Returns," NBER Working Papers 8308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Julia Lynn Coronado & Steven A. Sharpe, 2003. "Did Pension Plan Accounting Contribute to a Stock Market Bubble?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(2003-1), pages 323-371. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Mary Margaret Frank, 2002. "The Impact of Taxes on Corporate Defined Benefit Plan Asset Allocation," Journal of Accounting Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 1163-1190, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Luciano Greco, 2005. "The Optimal Design of Funded Pension Plans: Unbundling Financing and Investment," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0003, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
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