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Helping the Poor to Help Themselves: Debt Relief or Aid

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  • Serkan Arslanalp
  • Peter Blair Henry

Abstract

Debt relief is unlikely to stimulate investment and growth in the world's highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs). This is because the HIPCs do not suffer from debt overhang. The principal obstacle to investment and growth in the world's poorest countries is a lack of basic economic institutions that provide the foundation for profitable economic activity. If the goal is to help poor countries build the institutions that best suit their development needs, then the energy and resources currently devoted to the HIPC initiative could be more effectively employed as direct foreign aid.

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  • Serkan Arslanalp & Peter Blair Henry, 2004. "Helping the Poor to Help Themselves: Debt Relief or Aid," NBER Working Papers 10230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10230
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    1. Tengstam, Sven, 2006. "Debt relief and adjustment effort in a multi-period model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 127-130, April.
    2. Silvia Marchesi & Alessandro Missale, 2007. "How defensive were lending and aid to HIPC?," Working Papers 115, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 2007.
    3. Alvarez-Plata, Patricia & Brück, Tilman, 2008. "External Debt in Post-Conflict Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 485-504, March.
    4. Sen, Swapan & Kasibhatla, Krishna M. & Stewart, David B., 2007. "Debt overhang and economic growth-the Asian and the Latin American experiences," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 3-11, March.
    5. Danny Cassimon & Dennis Essers & Achmad Fauzi, 2014. "Indonesia's Debt-for-Development Swaps: Past, Present, and Future," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(1), pages 75-100, April.
    6. Aminu, Umaru & Ahmad Aminu, Hamidu & Salihu, Musa, 2013. "External Debt and Domestic Debt impact on the growth of the Nigerian Economy," MPRA Paper 75122, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Mr. Calixte Ahokpossi & Laurence Allain & Giovanna Bua, 2014. "A Constrained Choice? Impact of Concessionality Requirements on Borrowing Behavior," IMF Working Papers 2014/176, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Muhammad Mustapha Abdullahi & Nor Aznin Bt Abu Bakar & Sallahuddin B. Hassan, 2016. "Debt Overhang versus Crowding Out Effects: Understanding the Impact of External Debts on Capital Formation in Theory," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(1), pages 271-278.
    9. Muhammad Nayaz & Javed Husain, 2013. "Pakistan’s Monetary Aid Concerns," South Asian Journal of Management Sciences (SAJMS), Iqra University, Iqra University, vol. 7(1), pages 31-34, Spring.
    10. Nicolas Depetris Chauvin & Aart Kraay, 2007. "Who Gets Debt Relief?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 333-342, 04-05.
    11. Knoll, Martin, 2013. "The heavily indebted poor countries and the multilateral debt relief initiative: A test case for the validity of the debt overhang hypothesis," Discussion Papers 2013/11, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    12. Nicolas Depetris Chauvin & Aart Kraay, 2005. "What Has 100 Billion Dollars Worth of Debt Relief Done for Low- Income Countries?," International Finance 0510001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Johansson, Pernilla, 2008. "Debt Relief, Investment and Growth," Working Papers 2008:11, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    14. Djimeu, Eric W., 2018. "The impact of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative on growth and investment in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 108-127.
    15. Lorenzo Forni & Geremia Palomba & Joana Pereira & Christine Richmond, 2021. "Sovereign debt restructuring and growth [Investment cycles and sovereign debt overhang]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 671-697.
    16. Romero, Alfredo A. & Burkey, Mark L., 2011. "Debt Overhang in the Eurozone: A Spatial Panel Analysis," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 41(1), pages 49-63, Summer.
    17. Almuth Scholl, 2018. "Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 626-648, July.
    18. Bodo Herzog, 2016. "Modelling Monetary and Fiscal Governance in the Wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe," Economies, MDPI, vol. 4(2), pages 1-11, May.

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    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance

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