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Regulatory Constraints on CEO Compensation

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Author Info
Paul Joskow
Nancy Rose
Andrea Shepard

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Reprints with number 1825.

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Date of creation: Nov 1993
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Publication status: published as Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - Microeconomics, pp. 1-58 and 70-72, (1993)
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberre:1825

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  1. Nancy L. Rose & Andrea Shepard, 1994. "Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?," NBER Working Papers 4723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Francesc Trillas, 2004. "The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 28(2), pages 257-284, May. [Downloadable!]
  3. R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1995. "Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry," NBER Working Papers 4704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherin D. Wolfram, 1994. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," NBER Working Papers 4980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Germa Bel & Francesc Trillas, 2004. "Privatization, Corporate Control and Regulatory Reform: The case of Telefonica," Finance 0409053, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. DiNardo, John & Hallock, Kevin F. & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 2000. "Unions and the Labor Market for Managers," IZA Discussion Papers 150, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Robert E. Carpenter, 1994. "Finance Constraints or Free Cash Flow? The Impact of Asymmetric Information on Investment," Finance 9401001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. repec:fth:prinin:431 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Brian J. Hall, 1998. "The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 6674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 2000. "Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation," NBER Working Papers 7842, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do," Working Papers 810, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, 1994. "CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures," NBER Working Papers 4976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2006. "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," NBER Working Papers 12365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. repec:fth:prinin:340 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Cuñat, Vicente & Guadalupe, Maria, 2004. "Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors," IZA Discussion Papers 1123, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 2000. "Has the "Million-Dollar Cap" Affected CEO Pay?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 197-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Kevin Hallock, 1995. "Executive Pay and Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors," Working Papers 719, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  18. Bruce A. Rayton, 1996. "Rent-Sharing or Incentives? Estimating the Residual Claim of Average Employees," Labor and Demography 9603002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, 1994. "The Distribution of Public Sector Wage Premia: New Evidence Using Quantile Regression Methods," NBER Working Papers 4734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. John DiNardo & Kevin Hallock & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1997. "Unions and Managerial Pay," NBER Working Papers 6318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," NBER Working Papers 6213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Simon Grant & Stephen King & Ben Polak, 1995. "Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1107, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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