Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of six intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Personalized Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. Hence, the implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: ftp://ftp.econ.unavarra.es/pub/DocumentosTrab/DT1103.PDF
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra in its series Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra with number 1103.

as in new window
Length: pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in
Handle: RePEc:nav:ecupna:1103

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Campus de Arrosadía - 31006 Pamplona (Spain)
Phone: 34 948 169340
Fax: 34 948 169 721
Web page: http://www.econ.unavarra.es

Order Information:
Postal: Papers are not sent in a centralized mode. You can download them with ftp, or contact the authors.

Related research

Keywords: approval voting; characterization; anonymity.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ðura-Georg Granić, 2012. "Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 171-205, June.
  3. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
  4. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March.
  5. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2006. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 317-339, April.
  6. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  7. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
  8. Massó, Jordi & Vorsatz, Marc, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  9. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, . "Equity and the informational basis of collective choice," CORE Discussion Papers RP -350, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
  11. Baigent, Nick & Xu, Yongsheng, 1991. "Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-29, February.
  12. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
  13. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2011. "Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 143-149, March.
  14. Roberts, Fred S., 1991. "Characterizations of the plurality function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 101-127, April.
  15. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
  16. Sertel, Murat R., 1988. "Characterizing approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-211, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nav:ecupna:1103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Javier Puértolas).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.