This paper explores the introduction of a variable critical-level in a variable population context. We focus the attention on the "Critical- Level Egalitarian Ruleî, a social evaluation procedure which compares two social states as follows: (i) It reproduces the leximin criterion when applied to vectors of identical dimension and (ii) otherwise, it completes the small one with so many times a variable critical-level as to make the two vectors equal in size and applies the leximin criterion again. We prove that the use of a strict monotonic critical-level leads to the intransitivity of the social evaluation rule. This problem disappears when a weak monotonicity condition is required.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 2002.
"Utilitarianism and the theory of justice,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 543-596
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
BLACKORBY, Charles & BOSSERT, Walter & DONALDSON, David, 2006.
"Population Ethics,"
Cahiers de recherche
2006-15, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]