Beyond Divide-and-Rule: Sparking Civil War to Hold on Power
AbstractWe propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator carefully selects the tax rate over the subjects' production and the nation's natural resources to maximize his rent under the threat of a revolution. We show that it may be in the interest of a weak ruler to foster civil strife to enhance his taxing capacity. By exacerbating existing group antagonisms the leader weakens potential opposition, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. Important stocks of natural resources and an unequal distribution of these resources across ethnic groups makes this strategy more profitable for the ruler.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Namur, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1102.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- De Luca, Giacomo & Sekeris, Petros, 2009.
"Land Inequality and Conflict Intensity,"
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Frankfurt a.M. 2009
5, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
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