Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

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Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

Author Info

Bossert, W.
Derks, J.
Peters, H.

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Abstract

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2001-14.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-14

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Article
- Bossert, Walter & Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 2005. "Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 12-23, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Bossert,Walter & Derks,Jean & Peters,Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Research Memoranda 002, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
- BOSSERT, Walter & DERKS, Jean & PETERS, Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 173-189, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001. "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-10, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, . "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 98/8, University of Nottingham, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Hans Peters & Walter Bossert, 2002. "Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 489-502. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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