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Quasi-Transitive and Suzumura Consistent Relations

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  • BOSSERT, Walter
  • SUZUMURA, Kotaro

Abstract

We examine properties of binary relations that complement quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency in the sense that they, together with the original axiom(s), are equivalent to transitivity. In general, the conjunction of quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency is strictly weaker than transitivity but in the case of collective choice rules that satisfy further properties, the conjunction of quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency implies transitivity of the social relation. We prove this observation by characterizing the Pareto rule as the only collective choice rule such that collective preference relations are quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent but not necessarily complete.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 06-2009.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2009

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Related research

Keywords: Transitivity; Suzumura Consistency; Quasi-Transitivity; Pareto Rule;

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References

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  1. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2009. "Decisive Coalitions and Coherence Properties," Cahiers de recherche 05-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2008. "A characterization of consistent collective choice rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 311-320, January.
  3. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-91, November.
  4. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 185-92, April.
  5. Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-90, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.

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