Firm Reputation and Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9026.
Length: 19P. pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu & Bentley MacLeod, W., 1992. "Firm reputation and self-enforcing labor contracts," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 144-162, June.
- Macleod, W.B. & Kanemoto, Y., 1990. "Firm Reputation And Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9026, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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- Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "U-type versus J-type Tournaments as Alternative Solutions to the Unverifiability Problem," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014.
"Bonus pools and the informativeness principle,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 180-191.
- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 413, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Noda, Tomohiko & Hirano, Daisuke, 2013. "Enterprise unions and downsizing in Japan before and after 1997," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 91-118.
- Daiji Kawaguchi & Fumio Ohtake, 2004.
"Testing the Morale Theory of Nominal Wage Rigidity,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0602, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Daiji Kawaguchi & Fumio Ohtake, 2007. "Testing the Morale Theory of Nominal Wage Rigidity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(1), pages 59-74, October.
- Kawaguchi, Daiji & Ueno, Yuko, 2013. "Declining long-term employment in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 19-36.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2002.
"U-Type versus J-Type Tournaments,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 614-, December.
- Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2010.
"Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 180-191, August.
- Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2008. "Optimal Tournament Contracts for Heterogeneous Workers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 234, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2010. "Technology choice, relative performance pay, and worker heterogeneity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 748-758, December.
- Krakel, Matthias, 2003. "U-type versus J-type tournaments as alternative solutions to the unverifiability problem," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 359-380, June.
- Hirokatsu Asano & Takahiro Ito & Daiji Kawaguchi, 2011.
"Why Has the Fraction of Contingent Workers Increased? A Case Study of Japan,"
IDEC DP2 Series
1-3, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
- ASANO Hirokatsu & ITO Takahiro & KAWAGUCHI Daiji, 2011. "Why Has the Fraction of Contingent Workers Increased? A case study of Japan," Discussion papers 11021, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- Oliver Gürtler, 2010. "Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 100(3), pages 265-280, July.
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