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Risk Aversion in Bargaining: an Experimental Study


Author Info

  • Murnigham, J.K.
  • Roth, A.E.
  • Schoumaker, F.


Ce Document Presente Trois Experiences Faites Pour Tester les Predictions des Principaux Modeles de la Theorie des Jeux Qui Analysent les Consequences de L'attitude Envers le Risque Sur L'issue de la Negociations. les Resultats Confirment Modestement les Predictions de Ces Modeles. Ils Suggerent Toutefois Que Pour les Montants Consideres Dans Cette Etude, les Effets de "Pole D' Attraction" Sont Plus Significatifs Que les Effets de la Riscophobie.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 8536.

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Length: 27P. pages
Date of creation: 1985
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8536

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Related research

Keywords: Risk ; Game Theory;

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