Analyse des Effets de L'assurance et de la Relation de Confiance Consommateur-Producteur Sur les Possibilites D'abus des Chirurgiens
AbstractThe object of this paper is to analyse the effects of insurance and of the relation of trust between consumer and producer on the possibilities of fraud by the producer. Fraud is defined as the provision of unnecessary services to a consumer who does not possess full information about the quality of his purchase. The possibilities of fraud increase with insurance. In particular, they are very high with full insurance since real cost of search tends to infinite. Also we verify that good trust between consumer and producer limits search activities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 7948.
Length: 45P. pages
Date of creation: 1979
Date of revision:
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Assurance ; Consommateurs ; Producteurs ; Mede Cins;
Other versions of this item:
- Dionne, Georges, 1980. "Analyse des effets de l’assurance et de la relation de confiance consommateur-producteur sur les possibilités d’abus des chirurgiens," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 56(2), pages 211-238, avril-jui.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Frech, H E, III & Ginsburg, Paul B, 1975. "Imposed Health Insurance in Monopolistic Markets: A Theoretical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(1), pages 55-70, March.
- Kihlstrom, Richard E, 1974. "A Bayesian Model of Demand for Information About Product Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 99-118, February.
- Michael Grossman, 1976. "A Survey of Recent Research in Health Economics," NBER Working Papers 0129, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frank A. Sloan, 1970. "Lifetime earnings and physicians' choice of specialty," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 24(1), pages 47-56, October.
- Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
- Victor R. Fuchs, 1978. "The Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations," NBER Working Papers 0236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert G. Evans, 1976. "Does Canada have too many doctors? - Why nobody loves an immigrant physician," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 2(2), pages 147-160, Spring.
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