IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montde/2013-05.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance

Author

Listed:
  • EHLERS, Lars
  • KLAUS, Bettina

Abstract

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Suggested Citation

  • EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2013. "House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 2013-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-05
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/9777
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
    2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2004. "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 545-560, August.
    3. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2012. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference : Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 15-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Consistent House Allocation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 561-574, March.
    5. Fuhito Kojima & Mihai Manea, 2010. "Axioms for Deferred Acceptance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 633-653, March.
    6. Thayer Morrill, 2013. "An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 19-28, February.
    7. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2013. "House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 06-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    8. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
    9. Onur Kesten, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 17-21, March.
    10. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2009. "Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 2009-16, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    11. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2011. "Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems”," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 281-287, May.
    12. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1988. "Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 11-27, February.
    13. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    14. Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "Comparative statics in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 389-400, August.
    15. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
    16. Alvin E. Roth, 1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 617-628, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2016. "Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 128-146.
    2. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2012. "Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 2012-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    3. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2013. "House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 06-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2013. "House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 13.10, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    5. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2014. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 949-966, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2016. "Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 128-146.
    2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2013. "House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 13.10, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    3. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2014. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 949-966, November.
    4. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2009. "Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 17-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    5. Harless, Patrick, 2014. "A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance," MPRA Paper 61417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
    7. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2006. "Efficient priority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 372-384, May.
    8. Bettina Klaus & David F. Manlove & Francesca Rossi, 2014. "Matching under Preferences," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    9. Karakaya, Mehmet & Klaus, Bettina & Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2019. "Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    10. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2013. "Local and global consistency properties for student placement," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 222-229.
    11. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    12. Morrill, Thayer, 2015. "Making just school assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 18-27.
    13. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2007. "Fair and efficient student placement with couples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 177-207, October.
    14. Ehlers, Lars, 2014. "Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 64-87.
    15. Rong, Kang & Tang, Qianfeng & Zhang, Yongchao, 2020. "On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    16. Schummer, James & Abizada, Azar, 2017. "Incentives in landing slot problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 29-55.
    17. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
    18. Kesten, Onur, 2006. "On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 155-171, March.
    19. Matsui, Akihiko & Murakami, Megumi, 2022. "Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 50-65.
    20. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deferred-acceptance-algorithm; indivisible objects allocation; resource-monotonicity; strategy-proofness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sharon BREWER (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/demtlca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.