AbstractLocal interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are ‘close’ to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular forms of externalities, their presence typically suggests government action. I survey and discuss existing theoretical work on economies with local interactions and point to areas for further research.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2010-06.
Length: 66 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
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Conformity; externalities; local interactions; Markov perfect equilibrium; multiple equilibria; rational expectations; social interactions; social multiplier; strategic complementarities.;
Other versions of this item:
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-30 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aureo de Paula, 2004.
"Inference in a Synchronization Game with Social Interactions,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-017, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 May 2007.
- de Paula, Áureo, 2009. "Inference in a synchronization game with social interactions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 56-71, January.
- Blume,L.E. & Durlauf,S.N., 2005. "Identifying social interactions : a review," Working papers 12, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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