Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling
AbstractThis paper proposes an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy with an implicit market for productive time. In this market, agents buy or sell productive time. This implicit mar- ket gives rise to the formation of teams, organized in hierarchies with one leader (buyer) at the top and helpers (sellers) below. Relative to autarky, hierarchical organization leads to higher within and between team payo¤s/productivity inequality. This prediction is tested empir- ically in the context of professional road cycling. We show that the observed rise in performance inequality in the peloton since the 1970s is merely due to a rise in help intensity within team and consistent with a change in the hierarchical organization of teams.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht School of Management in its series Working Papers with number 2012/12.
Length: 77 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Hierarchical organization; productive time; helping time; inequality; professional cycling;
Other versions of this item:
- Bertrand Candelon & Arnaud Dupuy, 2014. "Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling," Working Papers 2014-044, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2012-08-23 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-SPO-2012-08-23 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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