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Brevet, secret et concurrence technologique : comment protéger les instruments de recherche ?

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  • Etienne Pfister

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    (CREDES et TEAM)

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    Abstract

    This article uses a two-step technological race model to evaluate the optimal protection of new research instruments, i.e., inventions that are not directly associated to commercial profits but that facilitate further technological progress. We show that paradoxically, granting the patentee an exclusive ownership right over all the research line and related applications (prospect doctrine) is optimal only when the R&D costs are relatively low and when the courts can implement mixed strategies regarding the settlement of patent trials (thus implying that identical legal cases lead to differing outcomes). In other settings, the court should rather force the infringer to pay a license fee proportionate to the R&D savings generated by the disclosure of the research instrument (enablement doctrine).

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    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/Bla04057.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number bla04057.

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    Length: 24 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla04057

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    Related research

    Keywords: Technological race; patent; secrecy; trial;

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    References

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    1. Kitch, Edmund W, 1977. "The Nature and Function of the Patent System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 265-90, October.
    2. Mark Schankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2000. "Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools," Economics Working Papers E00-288, University of California at Berkeley.
    3. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 51-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, 1999. "Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 133-160, 03.
    5. Merges, Robert P. & Nelson, Richard R., 1994. "On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, September.
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