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Competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information : an existence theorem for numeraire assets

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Author Info
Lionel de Boisdeffre () (CERMSEM)
Abstract

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete markets with nominal assets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (3) introduced refined concepts of " no-arbitrage " prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information. We now present the model with numeraire assets and study its existence properties. We show that equilibrium exists, as long as financial markets preclude arbitrage, under similar standard conditions, whether agents have symmetric or asymmetric information. This result departs from the rational expectations' outcome and extends to the asymmetric setting the classical existence property of symmetric information models with numeraire assets.

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File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2005/B05067.pdf
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Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number b05067.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05067

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Related research
Keywords: General equilibrium; asymmetric information; arbitrage; inference; existence of equilibrium.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets

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