Environmental Tax and the Distribution of Income among Heterogeneous Workers
AbstractThis paper analyzes the environmental tax policy issues when labor is heterogeneous. The objective is to assess whether an environmental tax policy could be Pareto improving, when the revenue of the pollution tax is recycled by a change in the labor tax properties. We show that, depending on the heterogeneity characteristics of labor and on the initial structure of the tax system, a policy mix could be designed in order to leave each class of worker unharmed. It consists of an increase in progressivity together with a decrease in the flat rate component of the wage tax.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number v08097.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision: Nov 2009
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Environmental tax; heterogenous agents; welfare analysis; tax progressivity.;
Other versions of this item:
- Mireille CHIROLEU-ASSOULINE & Mouez FODHA, 2011. "Environmental Tax and the Distribution of Income among Heterogeneous Workers," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 103-104, pages 71-92.
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2009-05-02 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-02 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2009-05-02 (Labour Economics)
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- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Mouez Fodha, 2012.
"From Regressive Pollution Taxes to Progressive Environmental Tax Reforms,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
12048, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Fodha, Mouez, 2014. "From regressive pollution taxes to progressive environmental tax reforms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 126-142.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Mouez Fodha, 2012. "From Regressive Pollution Taxes to Progressive Environmental Tax Reforms," CEEES Paper Series CE3S-03/12, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00719762 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Mouez Fodha, 2012. "From Regressive Pollution Taxes to Progressive Environmental Tax Reforms," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00719762, HAL.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Mouez Fodha, 2011. "Verdissement de la fiscalité. À qui profite le double dividende ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 409-431.
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