Are small countries leaders of the European tax competition ?
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the literature dealing with strategic fiscal behaviours of small EU countries using estimations of tax reaction functions of competing national governments. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg game, we use panel data and tools from spatial econometrics to examine the role of small countries in tax competition within the enlarged European Union. We find that interactions are stronger among smaller EU countries than between larges ones and rates set in small countries influence those in big countries. Finally, small countries located in the centre of the EU have more influence on tax policies choices of big countries than small countries located in the periphery of EU.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number bla08058.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital 75 647 PARIS CEDEX 13
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Strategic interactions; tax behaviours; spatial econometrics; European Union; tax competition; small countries.;
Other versions of this item:
- Nicolas Chatelais & Mathilde Peyrat, 2008. "Are Small countries leaders of the European tax competition ?," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00332479, HAL.
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Michael Devereux & Simon Loretz, 2012. "What do we know about corporate tax competition?," Working Papers 1229, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.