Elisabeth Cudeville () (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) Magali Recoules () (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)
Abstract
We present a model of household behavior to explore the complex interactions between the decision-making process within the household and social norms. The household is viewed as two separate spheres – the female and the male – both linked by a public good and a "conjugal contract" trough which spouses exchange resources. The conjugal contract negotiated within the couple is partly influenced by social norms given the conformism of individuals. Social norms are endogenously determined as the average conjugal contract. We find that the closer spouses' wages are in the labor market, the more equally they share household tasks. Wage policies promoting gender wage equality lead all couples to renegotiate the terms of their conjugal contract, which in turn changes social norms. Even though spouses aim at maximizing the household's welfare, the resulting equilibrium allocation is not Pareto efficient and inefficiency increases with social conformism.
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