This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Disability Benefits as Social Insurance: Tradeoffs Between Screening Stringency and Benefit Generosity in Optimal Program Design

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Timothy Waidman (Urban Institute)
John Bound (University of Michigan and NBER)
Austin Nichols (University of Michigan)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) system is designed to provide income security to workers in the event that health problems prevent them from working. In order to qualify for benefits, applicants must pass a medical screening that is intended to verify that the individual is truly incapable of work. Past research has shown, however, that the screening procedures used do not function without error. If screening were error-free, it has can be demonstrated that it is socially optimal to distinguish the disabled non-worker from the non-disabled, providing benefits to the disabled. In this paper we first demonstrate that if the errors in the medical screening are too large, it will not be optimal to distinguish the disabled from the non-disabled. Then, we use data on the actual quality of screening to determine first, if segmenting the non-working population is desirable, and second whether the current SSDI system relies too heavily on screening than is justified. Our preliminary conclusion is that while screening is good enough to justify some distinction in benefits, it may not be good enough to justify the size of the benefit offered.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/Papers/pdf/wp042.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center in its series Working Papers with number wp042.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mrr:papers:wp042

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48104
Phone: (734) 615-0422
Fax: (734) 647-4575
Email:
Web page: http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (MRRC Administrator).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Haveman, Robert H. & Wolfe, Barbara L., 1984. "Disability transfers and early retirement: a casual relationship?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 47-66, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. David T. Ellwood & Lawrence H. Summers, 1985. "Poverty in America: Is Welfare the Answer or the Problem?," NBER Working Papers 1711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Diamond, Peter & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1995. "Economic aspects of optimal disability benefits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was launched in September 1997.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-4.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.