Transfer Incentives for High-Performing Teachers: Final Results from a Multisite Randomized Experiment
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Mathematica Policy Research in its series Mathematica Policy Research Reports with number 7938.
Date of creation: 30 Nov 2013
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transfer incentives; randomized controlled trial; teacher effectiveness; value added;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I - Health, Education, and Welfare
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2013-11-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2013-11-22 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-URE-2013-11-22 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- Ali Protik & Steven Glazerman & Julie Bruch & Bing-ru Teh, 2013. "Staffing a Low-Performing School: Behavioral Responses to Selective Teacher Transfer Incentives," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 7996, Mathematica Policy Research.
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