Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Beliefs and Endogenous Cognitive Levels: An Experimental Study

Contents:

Author Info

  • Marina Agranov
  • Elizabeth Potamites
  • rew Schotter
  • Chloe Tergiman

Abstract

In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subjectʼs true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561200022X
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 503 Service Unavailable. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Joanne Pfleiderer) or (Joanne Lustig)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Mathematica Policy Research in its series Mathematica Policy Research Reports with number 7497.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 30 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mpr:mprres:7497

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Mathematica Policy Research P.O. Box 2393 Princeton, NJ 08543-2393 Attn: Communications
Fax: (609) 799-0005
Web page: http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Guessing game; Beliefs; Level-k theory;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  2. Tomasz Strzalecki, 1969. "Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs," Working Paper 8334, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  3. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2010. "Experience and insight in the Race game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 144-155, August.
  4. Robert Slonim, 2005. "Competing Against Experienced and Inexperienced Players," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 55-75, April.
  5. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, . "Field Centipedes," Economic theory and game theory 020, Oscar Volij.
  6. Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford, 2004. "Cognition And Behavior In Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000143, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, . "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0803, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
  8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Sundaram, Ramya & Butler, David J., 2010. "Epiphany in the Game of 21," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 132-143, August.
  9. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
  10. Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
  11. Christoph Bühren & Björn Frank, 2010. "Chess players' performance beyond 64 squares: A case study on the limitations of cognitive abilities transfer," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201019, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  12. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898, August.
  13. Grosskopf, Brit & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2008. "The two-person beauty contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 93-99, January.
  14. Weber, Roberto A., 2003. "'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 134-144, July.
  15. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Georg Weizs�cker, 2008. "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 729-762.
  16. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mikhail Drugov & Roberto Hernán-González & Praveen Kujal & Marta Troya Martinez, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment," Working Papers 13-32, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2014. "Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty contest," Working Papers 2014/13, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  3. Hyndman, Kyle & Terracol, Antoine & Vaksmann, Jonathan, 2013. "Beliefs and (In)Stability in Normal-Form Games," MPRA Paper 47221, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Le Coq, Chloe & Tremewan, James & Wagner, Alexander K., 2013. "Social Centipedes: the Impact of Group Identity on Preferences and Reasoning," SITE Working Paper Series 24, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
  5. Syngjoo Choi, 2012. "A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 215-250, September.
  6. Fehr, Dietmar & Huck, Steffen, 2013. "Who knows It is a game? On rule understanding, strategic awareness and cognitive ability," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-306, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  7. Shu-Heng Chen & Ye-Rong Du & Lee-Xieng Yang, 2014. "Cognitive capacity and cognitive hierarchy: a study based on beauty contest experiments," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 69-105, April.
  8. Allred, Sarah & Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2013. "Cognitive Load and Strategic Sophistication," MPRA Paper 47997, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpr:mprres:7497. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joanne Pfleiderer) or (Joanne Lustig).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.