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Bargeld, Giralgeld, Vollgeld: Zur Diskussion um das Geldwesen nach der Finanzkrise

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  • Martin Hellwig

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

Abstract

Der Aufsatz setzt sich kritisch mit verschiedenen Vorschlägen zur Reform des Geldwesens seit der Finanzkrise und mit den zugrundeliegenden Vorstellungen von „Geld“ auseinander. Das Wort „Geld“ wird in dieser Diskussion für verschiedene Dinge und in verschiedenen Bedeutungen gebraucht. Als paradox erweist es sich, dass die Diskussion um die Geldpolitik, auch die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, geprägt ist von der Vorstellung, dass die Ausgabe von Bargeld eine Verbindlichkeit der Zentralbank darstellt, ebenso die Einlagen der Geschäftsbanken bei der Zentralbank, während gleichzeitig die Diskussion um die Rolle der Geschäftsbanken im Geldwesen geprägt ist von der Vorstellung, dass diese durch ihre Kreditvergabe „Geld“ schöpfen und somit die Einlagenfinanzierung von Geschäftsbanken keine Schuldenfinanzierung ist. Beide Vorstellungen sind falsch, die eine, weil die Geldschöpfung der Zentralbank diese zu nichts verpflichtet, die andere, weil die Geldschöpfung der Geschäftsbanken sehr wohl Verpflichtungen schaffen, die Liquiditäts- und Solvenzrisiken mit sich bringen. Der zweite Teil des Aufsatzes geht kritisch auf radikale Reformvorschläge zur Abschaffung des Bargelds und zur Abschaffung der Geldschöpfung der Geschäftsbanken (Vollgeld-Initiative) ein. Erstere unterschätzen die Rolle des Bargelds als Grundlage aller auf Nominalwerte gerichteten Forderungen, u.a. der Forderungen an Geschäftsbanken, letztere unterschätzen die Möglichkeiten und die Risiken einer Substitution von Sichteinlagen durch andere „geldnahe“ Titel, z.B. Geldmarktfondsanteile. Die Vorstellung, man könne durch solche Änderungen die Komplexität der Interdependenz von Geldsystem und Banksystem reduzieren und die Aufgabe der Geldpolitik vereinfachen, ist unrealistisch.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Hellwig, 2018. "Bargeld, Giralgeld, Vollgeld: Zur Diskussion um das Geldwesen nach der Finanzkrise," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2018_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2018_10
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Hellwig, 2019. "Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? – Zur deutschen Diskussion um die Europäische Währungsunion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Paul Pichler & Martin Summer & Beat Weber, 2020. "Does digitalization require Central Bank Digital Currencies for the general public?," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q4/19, pages 40-56.
    3. Paul Pichler & Alexander Schierlinger-Brandmayr & Martin Summer, 2018. "Digital money," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q3/18, pages 23-35.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System

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