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The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process

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  • Giuseppe Albanese

    ()
    (Bank of Italy)

  • Marco M. Sorge

    ()
    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker – and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task – with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.

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File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_23online.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2010_23.

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Date of creation: May 2010
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Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_23

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Keywords: Illegal lobbying; Endogenous policy making; Judicial control;

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  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.
  2. Anne van Aaken & Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator," CESifo Working Paper Series 2245, CESifo Group Munich.
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