Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights
AbstractI study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In equilibrium at most one firm shares some of its technologies. For similar technology distributions, there exists an equilibrium in which nobody shares. If the technology distributions are skewed towards efficient technologies, then there may exist equilibria in which one firm shares all technologies, only the best technologies, or only intermediate technologies. No other equilibria can exist.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2009_36.
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Innovation; strategic disclosure; trade secret; Cournot duopoly; indivisibility; open source; skewed distribution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-03-20 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-03-20 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-03-20 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-INO-2010-03-20 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2010-03-20 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-TID-2010-03-20 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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- Llanes, Gastón & de Elejalde, Ramiro, 2013.
"Industry equilibrium with open-source and proprietary firms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 36-49.
- Gastón Llanes & Ramiro de Elejalde, 2009. "Industry Equilibrium with Open Source and Proprietary Firms," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-149, Harvard Business School.
- Cho, Myeonghwan & Jun, Byung-hill, 2013. "Information sharing with competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 81-84.
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