Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation
AbstractThe imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms.profits and the probability of innovation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2009_06.
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
R&D competition; innovation; spillovers; information disclosure; strategic substitutes; free-rider effect; externality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-03-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2009-03-22 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-CTA-2009-03-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-INO-2009-03-22 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-03-22 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-KNM-2009-03-22 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-MIC-2009-03-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2009-03-22 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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- Christian Traxler, 2009.
"Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2009_22, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Traxler, Christian, 2012. "Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 1-9.
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