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Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Felix Bierbrauer () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
This paper assumes that individuals possess private information both about their abilities and about their valuation of a public good. Individuals can undertake collective actions on order to manipulate the tax system and the decision on public good provision. Consequently, an implementable scheme of taxation has to be collectively incentive compatible. If preferences are additively separable, then an implementable tax systems has the following properties: (i) tax payments do not depend on public goods preferences and (ii) there is no scope for a collective manipulation of public goods preferences. For a quasilinear economy, the optimal tax system is explicitly characterized.
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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number
2006_24.
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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_24Contact details of provider: Postal: Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10 - D- 53113 Bonn Phone: +49-(0)228 / 91416-0 Fax: +49-(0)228 / 91416-55 Email: Web page: http://www.coll.mpg.de/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Optimal Taxation ; Public Good Provision ; Revelation of Preferences ; Information Aggregation ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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