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Social Dilemmas, Revisited from a Heuristics Perspective

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Author Info
Christoph Engel () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany)

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Abstract

The standard tool for analysing social dilemmas is game theory. They are reconstructed as prisoner dilemma games. This is helpful for understanding the incentive structure. Yet this analysis is based on the classic homo oeconomicus assumptions. In many real world dilemma situations, these assumptions are misleading. A case in point is the contribution of households to climate change. Decisions about using cars instead of public transport, or about extensive air conditioning, are typically not based on ad hoc calculation. Rather, individuals rely on situational heuristics for the purpose. This paper does two things: it offers a model of heuristics, in the interest of making behaviour that is guided by heuristics comparable to behaviour based on rational reasoning. Based on this model, the paper determines the implications for the definition of social dilemmas. In some contexts, the social dilemma vanishes. In other contexts, it must be understood, and hence solved, in substantially different ways.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2004_4.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_4

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Related research
Keywords: Heuristic Social Dilemma Public Good Prisoner’s Dilemma

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dawes, Robyn M., 1999. "A message from psychologists to economists: mere predictability doesn't matter like it should (without a good story appended to it)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 29-40, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lluís Bru & Xavier Vives, 2002. "Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 127(1), pages 91-, March.
    Other versions:
  3. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Simon, Herbert A, 1979. "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 493-513, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Selten, Reinhard, 1996. "Aspiration Adaptation Theory," Discussion Paper Serie B 389, University of Bonn, Germany.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christoph Engel, 2007. "Institutions for Intuitive Man," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
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