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Bundling, Collusion and Access Price Regulation

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Author Info
Edmond Baranes
Jean-Christophe Poudou

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Abstract

This paper studies how sustainability of collusion can be influenced by both access pricing and pricing strategies of firms. We develop a model of multiproduct duopoly in vertically related industry which allows us to study how the relationship between access pricing and collusion sustainability depends on substitutability between composite goods and the direct price effect on demand.

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File URL: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr/Cahiers/cahier251208.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2008.25.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2008.25

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, LASER, Av. de la Mer - Espace Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
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Related research
Keywords: Collusion; Access Pricing; Bundling;

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This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.

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