Political institutions and central bank independence revisited
AbstractWe build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi" in its series Department of Economics with number 0616.
Length: pages 5
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
ICentral Bank independence; institutional systems; variable selection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2009-11-07 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2009-11-07 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2009-11-07 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-11-07 (Positive Political Economics)
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