This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Political institutions and central bank independence revisited

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Davide Ferrari ()
Barbara Pistoresi ()
Francesco Salsano ()
Abstract

We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://merlino.unimo.it/web_dep/materiali_discussione/0616.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi" in its series Department of Economics with number 0616.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: pages 5
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mod:depeco:0616

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dep.unimore.it/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Monica Morselli).

Related research
Keywords: ICentral Bank independence; institutional systems; variable selection;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.